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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS & 
CROSS-APPELLANTS 
Supreme Court No. 20626 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. ISSUES PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
Plaintiffs have no substantial disagreement with the 
issues presented by Defendant as appellant in its Brief 
except that in issues #3, #4, #5 and #6, Defendant asserts 
that "no evidence 1 1 supporting the court !s decision was 
presented. Those are false conclusions or statements. 
Plaintiffs did present evidence supporting the court's 
decision. 
B. ISSUES PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFFS/CROSS-APPELLANT ON CROSS-
APPEAL 
1. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress. Did the 
Trial Court err in dismissing Plaintiff-Henderson's claim 
for intentional infliction of mental distress because the 
court found, as a matter of law, that he could make no 
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such claim bacause the property taken was not his property? 
2. Costs and Attorney's Fees for Refusal to Admit. 
Did the Trial Court err is refusing to order the Defendant 
to reimburse Plaintiff for professional witness fees and 
transportation costs and attorney's fees incurred as a 
result of Defendant's failure or refusal to admit that three 
documents were indentical copies and what the Bankruptcy 
Court's Clerk general proceedures were? 
3. Wrongful Interference With Favorable Business 
Relationshi ps. Did the court err in failing to find that the 
Defendant interferred with favorable business relationships 
between Plaintiff, David Hale, and Mitchell Henderson and 
Ileen Buttars, and in failing to award damages incidental 
thereto? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Pi sposi tion i n Court Below 
Ileen Buttars, the mother of Plaintiff, Laurena 
Henderson, and grandmother of Plaintiff, Mitchell Henderson, 
brought an action against Defendant for taking and convertin 
cement forming equipment she had purchased from her grandson 
Mitchell. The forms were temporarily stored on the premises 
of her daughter, Laurena, who has sued Defendant for trespas 
when Defendant's employees came upon her property which was 
posted with no trespassing signs, drove across her back lawn 
leaving ruts. The grandson, M i t c h e l l , who had become ill an 
financially distressed, after selling the forms to his 
grandmother, continued in charge of the forms trying to sell 
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them or rent them for her. The loss of the forms and 
attending circumstances caused Mitchell to suffer mental and 
emotional distress for which he sued Defendant. The would-be 
purchaser and lessor of the forms, David Hale, sued the 
Defendant for interfering with the impending lease and sale 
and the resultant losses suffered by him. 
Defendant, a creditor of Mitchell, claimed it had a 
right to the cement forms in spite of the sale to the 
grandmother and in spite of a subsequent bankruptcy by 
Mitchell three years later and a year before the forms were 
taken. 
The trial court found that the sale of the forms by 
Mitchell to his grandmother, Ileen Buttars, for approximately 
$26,000.00 was valid, especially in light of the fact that 
Defendant, prior to the taking and prior to the date of 
Mitchell's bankruptcy filing, had taken a promissory note 
from Mitchell for approximately $3,000.00 and converted it 
to a judgment. The trial court consequently awarded Ileen 
Buttars damages of $5,725.35 for the value of the forms plus 
additional damages of $7,500.00 suffered as a result of the 
taking which rendered the other half of the forms useless 
for re-sale or for renting for a period of three y e a r s . 
The court found that Mitchell Henderson had no claim for 
intentional infliction of mental distress because the forms 
were not his, and found no cause for action by David Hale 
for Defendant's interference with his purchase or rental of 
the forms and for putting him out of business. But because 
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it became clear at trial that Defendant had wrongfully 
overcharged Mr. Hale on his account, the court awarded him 
$265.00. The court awarded Mrs. Henderson $100.00 as a 
result of Defendant's trespassing. 
Statement of Facts 
In September, 1976, Mitch Henderson purchased a variety 
i 
of For-Shor forms from the Defendant through either of two 
companies: Interstate Industries or Wallmaster, Inc. 
(Exhibit # 1 8 ) . These forms were in essence indentical to 
the eight foot and four foot forms he subsequently leased in 
1977 and then purchased from Defendant in August, 1978 
(assuming that all forms were in new c o n d i t i o n ) . First 
Security Bank took a security interest in the 1976 forms 
(Exhibit # 1 ) , which it subsequently released in August, 
1978, when Ileen Buttars paid off $30,884.18 in debts owed 
by Mitchell to the bank (Exhibits #7 and #8, and Ileen 
Buttars 1 testimony T.p.83 line 3 4 ) . 
In the spring of 1978, both Defendant and Defendant's 
counsel had demanded payment for the forms under rental , or 
Mitchell would be sued. In June, 1978, Defendant, without 
authority and on it's own iniative (Exhibits #17, and #4, 
printed matter) converted the leased forms to a purchase and 
charged Mitchell's account $5,119.00 (Exhibit # 4 ) . Upon 
receiving a billing statement (Exhibit #3) reflecting the 
change from rent to purchase, Mitchell called Jim Snarr and 
told him he would be in their office in a month or so and 
pay off the forms (T. p p . 1 9 - 2 0 ) . The payoff figure was not 
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satisfactory so Mitchell negotiated with Jim Snarr for some 
additional credit on the purchase price since he had rented 
for about nine months and his account had been charged at 
the rate if 8 percent of the purchase price per month (equals 
72 percent of the cash purchase p r i c e ) . Additional credit 
of $2,180.00 was given (Exhibit #5 and # 3 ) . Mitchell then 
paid off the forms and gave additional monies to be applied 
to his account (T.pp.20, 2 3 - 2 4 ) . Total amount paid was 
$6,400.00 (Exhibit # 6 ) . 
First Security Bank having received full payment on its 
loans ($30,884.18) and For-Shor having received more than 
the cash purchase price on the forms converted from rent to 
purchase (purchase price charged was $5,119.21 and cash paid 
was $ 6 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 ) . Mitchell felt free to convey the forms to 
his grandmother, Ileen Buttars, as per their agreement 
(Exhibit #2, T.p.25 line 7 ) . Ileen Buttars purchased both 
the original For-Shor forms plus the ones which had been 
rented from For-Shor, in August, 1978, thinking they were 
all one set which had been held as security by First Security 
Bank. She knew nothing of the For-Shor Company until after 
For-Shor took some of the forms from Clarkston (T.p.81 
line 21; p.85 line 2 ) . Mitchell was instructed by his 
grandmother to find a buyer for all the mod-u-form panels 
and equipment if he could (T.p.84 line 1 8 ) . He offered them 
for sale to a number of people but didn't find a buyer 
( T . p . 3 2 ) . He then decided to generate revenue from them by 
leasing them out and did so between April 13, 1981, and July 
9, 1981 ( T . p . 3 4 ) . Revenue for those three to four months 
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was approximately $2,500.00 (Exhibit #9 and #10) (T.p.24 
line 1 5 ) . On July 9, 1981, Defendant came to Clarkston and 
took a little less than half of the set. This action prevented 
the sale of the entire set to David Hale referred to below. 
T.p.37 line 1-10. 
In 1978-1979, Mitchell still owed an account balance to 
Defendant of about $1,600.00 -- $3,500.00 (Exhibit #3) 
( T . p . 2 5 ) . When he was unable to pay the account off, 
Defendant sued him, not bothering to amend the complaint 
which had been prepared in early 1978 when Mitchell was 
still renting the forms (T.p.162) (Exhibit # 2 4 ) . In response 
to the summons, Mitchell came to Defendant's office, arranged 
to pay the balance of this account by signing a promissory 
note on September 6, 1979, (Exhibit #37) ( T . p . 2 6 - 2 7 ) . He 
made two payments on that note and then bad health prevented 
him from working further and making additional payments. 
Defendant then amended the complaint to sue on the note in 
December, 1979, (Exhibit #24) and took a default judgment on 
February 13, 1980, (Exhibit # 2 4 ) . Bad health continued for 
Mitchell and he filed for bankruptcy on July 16, 1980, 
(Exhibit #25) and received a discharge on September 18, 
1980 (Exhibit # 1 6 ) . According to Bankruptcy Court Clerk, 
Mary Beth Simpson, the Bankruptcy Court mailed two documents 
on two different occasions to Defendant notifying it of 
Plaintiffs 1 filing and subsequent discharge (Notice of First 
Meeting of Creditors and Notice of Discharge) (T.p.28 
line 3 - 1 3 ) . A copy of the first notice (Notice of First 
Meeting of Creditors) identical to other photocopies of the 
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same copy generation mailed to other of Mitchell's creditors 
listed on the creditor's matrix (Exhibit #25) was found in 
Defendant's file containing some of its collection efforts 
(Douglas Caywood's testimony; T.p.113 line 18 — p . 1 1 4 , 
line 15; Exhibit # 1 9 ) . Defendant did not explain with 
certainty as to how the notice got into the file. It was 
folded in fours and copied on both sides as is the custom in 
mailings from the Bankruptcy Court (T.p.227 line 11-24; 
T.p.344 line 7--p.345 line 2 ) . 
After judgment was taken against Mitchell, Defendant 
made one attempt to serve him with a supplemental order in 
1980. There was evidence that indicated the Defendant made 
no effort to collect on its judgment after the mailing of 
the Notice of First Meeting of Creditors in July, 1980, 
until July, 1981, a full year after the discharge. Testimony 
from James Snarr and Mitchell Hendersc^i indicated that 
although Mitchell moved several times between 1977 and 1981, 
all billing statements and correspondence sent by Defendant 
to Mitchell were never returned to the sender, but were 
received by Mitchell (T . pp . 351-352 , 4 2 4 ) . 
The facts also reveal that when Mitchell signed Defen-
dant's Account Agreement in 1976, Defendant made no attempt 
to explain its meaning or even give him time to read it, 
(T.p.497) which incidentally Mitchell could not do at that 
time ( T . p . 4 9 5 ) . There is no other document before the Court 
signed by Mitchell specifically identifying the forms in 
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question as being leased and what the terms of the lease were. 
In early July, 1981, David Hale, who had been leasing 
some cement forming equipment from Defendant, came to 
Defendant's business to purchase some ties for two jobs he 
had lined up in Tremonton. In his conversation with Dan 
Sharp, he mentioned he was going to buy Mitchell's set and 
use them on the two jobs in Tremonton ( T . p . 3 1 3 ) . Dan Sharp 
then remembered Mitchell still owed his company some money 
(T.pp.292-293 ). He reviewed the account and the file with 
Jim Snarr, copied an invoice indicating what items of 
equipment he had originally leased and subsequently converted 
to purchase in 1978 (Plaintiffs 1 Exhibit #4) and took a copy 
of it to Clarkston and took most of those items back 
(Defendant's Exhibit # 2 7 ) . Defendant newer gave anyone 
notice of its taking until the Sheriff's Office confronted 
it several months later. The effect of taking a half set of 
forms was to stop the lease and sale to David Hale T . p e 3 1 1 . 
As a result of the taking, David Hale had insufficient 
forms to do his Tremonton job and naturally went to Defen-
dant with whom he was doing business and told Dan Sharp that 
someone had stolen his forms, and to keep his eyes open for 
them (T.pp.311, 3 1 3 - 3 1 4 ) . Dan told him he would watch for 
them. He then leased some forms to Dave Hale mainly to 
replace the ones stolen (T.p.397 line 20--p.398 line 8 ) . 
The extra effort to get an entire set together (partially 
from Salt Lake and partially from Clarkston) forced David 
Hale to rent trucks, cancel his plans to buy the Henderson 
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and other equipment, (T. p.396-398) and to expend approxi-
mately $1,500.00--$2,000.00 in extra time, wages, rent and 
other expenses to get the jobs done (T.pp.315-319; Exhibit 
#30, #31, #32 and # 3 4 ) . Not having his own truck or trailer 
prevented him from immediately loading the forms when 
stripping the foundation. Instead he had to stack them on 
the ground and then handle them again after renting a truck 
to haul some here and some there (T. pp. 3 2 9 - 3 3 0 ) . These were 
the factors contributing to the $2,000.00 loss (Exhibits 
#30, #31, #32, #33 and #34 all evidence this l o s s ) . 
Not only did David Hale suffer the $2,000.00 loss, but 
he also lost an opportunity to go into business (T.pp.332-
334; T.p.398 line 1 - 2 ) . He had made application to a 
leasing company for financing (using the forms as col-
lateral) (T.p.339 line 12--p.400) and could have used his 
mother's house as collateral as well, had the lender re-
quested it (T. pp.41 9-422) . He had lined up a truck and 
trailer he could have used for 90 days with option to buy 
and had good possibilities for additional jobs in the 
Tremonton area from people who had inspected his work 
(T.pp.390, 413 line 2 0 - - p . 4 1 4 ) . He had also submitted a bid 
to people in Wyoming for whom he had done work that spring 
and who wanted him to do more (Plaintiffs' Exhibit # 3 5 ) . He 
had to withdraw that bid when he realized he'd have to 
commercially lease forms to replace the ones taken (T. pp. 390, 
397 line 2 2 ) . 
Mr. Hale is a experienced formsetter and had set one 
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house f o u n d a t i o n per day on other jobs before (T. pp. 395 -
3 9 7 ) . C o n s i d e r i n g the e c o n o m y , he felt he could e a s i l y do 
one to two per week ( T . p . 3 8 7 ) . He c a l c u l a t e d that his 
profit would be s o m e w h e r e areound $ 1 5 0 . 0 0 per a v e r a g e home 
f o u n d a t i o n per week ( T . p p . 3 8 6 - 3 8 8 ; T.p.415 line 2 4 - p . 4 1 7 ) . 
After reviewing D e f e n d a n t ' s charges to Mr. Hale's 
account while he and D e f e n d a n t were doing b u s i n e s s in 
p r e p a r a t i o n for t r i a l , it was d i s c o v e r e d that D e f e n d a n t 
charged him $ 2 6 5 . 0 0 for r e t u r n i n g dirty forms when in fact 
they were dirty when he checked them out (Exhibit # 3 9 ) 
(T.pp.434-436). 
Robert Mortensen, a yery well respected general building 
and cement contractor testified that for someone to take a 
substantial portion of a "set" of foundation forms would 
stop any cement forming business in its tracks (T.p.,379 
line 8 - 1 8 ) . He also testified that he rented out cement 
forms at the rate of $1.00 per form per pour ( T . p . 3 8 1 ) . He 
testified he had no trouble finding work for his two sets of 
forms, but that business was competitive ( T . p . 3 8 1 ) . He 
thought that Hale could probably find houses to do (T.p.380 
line 22--p.381 line 2 ) . When Hale went to Defendant's 
place to rent forms to replace the ones stolen, he found 
it to be very busy. T.p.326. No other forms were available 
in Cache Valley. T.p.398. 
In trying to recall the retaking incident, Dan Sharp, 
who is no longer employed by Defendant, remembered going 
through an open field along a little road lined with weeds. 
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He recalled that the forms taken were not in the best 
condition and denied that the property was posted with "no 
trespassing" signs. Mrs. Laurena Henderson and Mitchell, 
her son, testified that her property was posted with several 
no trespassing signs, (Exhibit #11; T.pp.94, 97 line 21--
99) that there were sheds and grainries around and that the 
little drive that led to the forms was graveled and free of 
weeds and that her back lawn went right back to the drive-
way. She said that the people who took the forms traveled 
right past several signs on their way in (Exhibit 
#11) and then on their way out traveled diagonally through 
her back lawn and through a spot of newly planted grass 
leaving ruts or tire depressions in the lawn and soil 
(T.p.100; Exhibit #11 ) . 
When For-Shor got the forms it reconditioned them and 
put them in their rental pool which earns 8 percent of their 
list price per month (T.p.436 line 14--p.437 line 3 ) . The 
list price has escalated from 1978, when they were converted 
to purchase, to February, 1984, where they were priced 
at 7 percent to 9 percent over the prices listed in Defen-
dant's Exhibit #27 and page three of Exhibit #28 (T.pp.437-
4 3 8 ) . 
Used forms today are worth at least as much as new ones 
a few years ago. T.pp. 2 34-235. All of the forms can be 
put in new condition by merely sandblasting the frames, 
repainting them and by putting new plywood in the frames 
( T . p p . 3 5 8 - 3 5 9 ) . Mr. Snarr inspected the remainder of the 
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forms at Laurena Henderson's place in Clarkston in late 1983 
and stated in Court that those particular forms had a value 
of 76 percent of new (T.p.437 line 4 ) . However, he had no 
way to distinquish between the forms bought by Mitchell 
initially and those later leased and then converted to 
purchase. T.p.221 line 25--p.222 line 6. He calculated the 
value by figuring what it would cost to recondition them and 
thereby put them in new condition (T.p.438 line 21--p„439; 
T.pp.440-441 ). New prices as of February, 1984, for the 
items Defendant admits it took would be: 
55 2'x8' panels 
24 2'x8' panels 
2 8'x6' inside corners 
2 4'x6' inside corners 
900 wedge bolts 
1982 Price 
96.00 x 8% = 
53.00 x 8% = 
65.00 x 8% = 
32.00 x 8% = 

















(Exhibit #26 and #28; T.p.440-441 J 
Mitchell and David Hale both testified that the forms 
taken were mostly reconditioned because they had been 
preparing them for Hale's Tremonton jobs, the owner or 
contractor for which was yery fussy (T.p.310). They both 
said the forms were in excellent condition (T.pp.357-359 
line 17; T.p.438 line 21-p.439 line 7 ) . Thus, the figures 
set forth above are the minimum. 
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Mrs. Buttars, although generating about $2,500,00 in 
revenue for the first half of 1981, (T.p.31 line 23; Exhibit #9 
and #10; T.p.34 line 12-29) could generate no further business 
when people learned she had only about a half set (T.pp.37~ 
40 line 18; T.p.104 line 1-20; T.p.381 line 9 - 1 4 ) . She has 
been without the forms or without compensation therefor for 
over three years (July 1981, when h of forms were taken, to 
date of trial , July 31 , 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Prior to trial and after discovering what what thought 
to be the original notice of Mitchell Henderson's bankruptcy 
in Defendant's collection files, Plaintiff's counsel obtained 
notices which had been mailed to two of Henderson's creditors 
and had those notices compared to the notice found in 
Defendant's file (R.p. 2 2 6 - 2 2 9 ) . This comparison was done 
by a documents expert, Mr. Douglas A. Caywood, of Colorado. 
All three documents along with Mr. Caywood's written analysis 
were offered to Defendant's counsel at the time Plaintiff's 
counsel requested that Defendant admit that all three copies 
were from the same copy machine produced at the same time 
(R.p. 2 2 6 ) . The request was made so that Plaintiffs would 
not be required to have the expert travel to Utah to estab-
lish that fact. Defendant refused to admit, (R.p. 240) so 
Plaintiff produced the witness to prove the point, but the 
court refused to order the Defendant to pay any costs incurred 
as a result of Defendant's failure to admit. Plaintiff's 
intent was to prove that Defendant had actual notice of 
Defendant's bankruptcy as an element of Plaintiff's claim 
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for punitive damages as well as to rebutt some of Defendant's 
other claims. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Response to Appellant's summaries 
1. Right To Repossess. Defendant can have no right to 
repossess because Mitchell's response to Defendant's demands 
for payment for the forms in 1978 was to pay off the forms 
($5,119.21) with a $6,400.00 check with the balance being 
applied to his account. This together with his grandmother's 
payment of approximately $26,000.00 to his lender gave him 
unquestionable feedom to transfer title to his grandmother, 
which he did three years before the claimed repossession. 
Also, Defendant's taking a promissory note from Plaintiff 
and the subsequent reduction of that note to a judgment 
leaves Defendant with no other remedies or claims against 
the property. The theory of fraud allegedly committted by 
Mitchel which allegedly motivated Defendant to take the 
promissory note is in conflict with testimony and other 
evidence introduced at trial and upon which the trial court 
based its decision and has insufficient basis for reversing 
the trial court's decision. 
2. Sale of the Forms to Ileen Buttars as "Bona fide 
Purchaser". Mrs. Buttars knew that Mitchell had some Mod-u-
forms and that he was willing to sell them all to her for 
$26,000.00 if she would pay off his lender, First Security 
Bank, which she did. She knew nothing of any For-Shor claim 
to the forms and Defendant did nothing by way of public 
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filings or otherwise to place her on notice. The court, in 
light of Plaintiff Henderson's and Buttar's testimony and 
the written bill of sale, (Exhibit #2) found specifically 
against Defendant's claims that there was no sale. 
3. Damages Awarded to Plaintiff Hale. During the 
course of the trial it was discovered and clearly estab-
lished that in its business dealings with Plaintiff-Hale 
when he went to Defendant to rent forms to replace the ones 
stolen, that Defendant had overcharged him. This was freely 
admitted by Defendant and so Hale was awarded judgment of 
$265.00 to correct the overcharge as viewed by the court. 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure allows a 
judge to grant the relief dictated by the evidence even 
though not pleaded. 
4. Damages for Loss of Rental. Plaintiffs did offer 
evidence to establish loss of rentals. The evidence came 
both from Plaintiffs and from Defendant's manager who 
admitted that the forms taken went into its rental pool from 
which Defendant rents the forms at 8 percent of their new 
value per month or 96 percent per annum! Judgment for 
Plaintiff was for $2,500.00 per year for three years. 
5. Value of Forms. Plaintiff's offered evidence of 
value of the forms taken in several ways: What a pro-
spective purchaser was willing to pay, what had been paid 
for the forms originally, current new prices, cost to restore 
the forms to new condition, and the value of used forms 
generally. Much of the testimony came from Defendant's 
employees. 
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6. Damages for Trespass. Plaintiff, Laurena Henderson, 
discribed the damage of truck tire ruts through a new part 
of her back lawn and the court awarded $100.00. D e f e n d a n t s 
objection to that award is without merit. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S DECISION 
THAT MITCHELL HENDERSON PAID FOR THE FORMS 
IN FULL WITH CASH AND A PROMISSORY NOTE, 
AND THAT HE MADE NO MISREPRESENTATIONS 
WHICH WOULD VOID THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
1. In arguing that Mitchell induced For-Shor to t 
promissory note, Defendant now attempts to hang its ent 
case on the testimony of its own attorney who was going 
conduct the trial and not even testify 1 R.pp. 191-192. 
Counsel disqualified himself only at the request of Pla 
because Plaintiffs intended to call him, not because De 
dant saw that Attorney Burnett's testimony would be the 
backbone of their defense. During discovery when Plain 
tried to get Defendant to divulge information regarding 
sales and rental prices for the equipment in question, 
Attorney Duane Burnett himself responded in writing sta 
that such facts were irrelevant because all charges for 
things by Defendant against Plaintiff "...were reduced 
note and agreement, thereby rendering the same moot." 













scheduled trial date, Attorney Burnett was claiming the note 
was good and valid. Later, the defense realized that any 
claims it wanted to make on repossessing the equipment 
should have been made before its claims were merged into a 
promissory note and a judgment. It could not split its 
cause of action. Raymer vs. Hi-Line Transport, Inc. 15 Ut. 
2d 427 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Caste v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 597 F2d 
1323 (Okla. 1 9 7 9 ) . Having realized that, Defendant then 
sought and found an excuse for doing so: According 
to Attorney Burnett, Mitchell told him that the forms were 
stolen, so Defendant had to settle for a promissory note. 
Mitchell emphatically denied this. (Tpp 523-524 line 14, p.5 
line 16.) Furthermore, immediately after signing the note, 
he requested and got permission to return some of the forms 
Defendant claims were stolen! (T.p. 371.) Why would a 
person lie and say the forms were stolen and sign a promis-
sory note for the balance owing on the goods and then a 
couple days later return some of those reportedly "stolen" 
forms to the same creditor for credit?'. The answer is that 
Mitchell Henderson never told Attorney Burnett that the 
forms had been stolen. (T.p. 371 line 4--p.472 line 3; 
Exhibit #37 3rd page. ) 
Defendant tried to add credibility to Attorney Burnett 1 
claims that Mitchell had represented that the forms were 
stolen based on a representation made in his bankruptcy 
statement of Affairs. It refers to Question 14 of Exhibit 
#29, but is probably referring to the answer to Question 18 
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of Exhibit #29 wherein Mitchell disclosed that some "equip-
ment" had been stolen in July, 1979. Mitchell reported that 
there was vandalism or theft of a variety of equipment on 
three occasions (T.p.523 line 22) including outside and 
inside corners, but that none of the forms purchased from 
Defendant in 1978 were affected. (T.p.524 line 19, p.526) 
It should be clear based on the above referenced 
exhibits and testimony that Defendant has no basis for 
asking this Court to reverse the trial Court's decision 
regarding Defendant's belated claim or defense of fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation. 
II 
THERE WAS A BONA FIDE SALE OF THE FORMS 
FROM HENDERSON TO BUTTARS. DEFENDANT 
CAN CLAIM NO SECURITY INTEREST BECAUSE 
IT PRODUCED NO SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
NOR CAN IT IDENTIFY THE SECURITY. 
Defendant claims there is a distinction between the 
For-Shor forms purchased through Interstate Industries in 
1976 and the forms converted from lease to purchase in July 
and August, 1978. It is true there were two purchases of 
similar forms at two different times and Defendant has not 
ever attempted to show the trial court or this court that it 
could distinguish between the forms purchased on the two 
different dates. Of course, depending on use and abuse of 
each individual form, their condition may vary greatly 
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and they are not fungible goods as claimed by Defendant. 
Because Defendant has never provided as means of proving 
which forms are which, it cannot prevail on its attempted 
re-possession. 
It is true that Mrs. Buttars thought all the For-Shor 
forms were secured at First Security when she paid off 
Mitchell's loans there, but she also knew that her agreement 
with Mitchell was to buy his Mod-u-forms (For-Shor t y p e ) . 
They were listed on the Bill of Sale. Exhibit #2; T.p. 65-
66. T.pp. 81-90. Her payment of approximately 30,000 on 
Mitchell's loans (Exhibit #1,#7, and #8) certainly is 
evidence of giving value. Mrs. Buttars certainly had no 
actual (T.p.85) or constructive notice of any claim of 
ownership of the forms being made by Defendant (T. pp. 220-221 ) . 
Mr. Henderson paid $6,400.00 for the forms and on his 
account as insisted by Defendant before he could obtain any 
more credit from the Defendant. (T.pp.19-25; T.p. 363 line 20-
p.264 line 25. ) 
The list of facts recited by Defendant on page 24 of 
its breif are mostly either disputed or completely untrue. 
For example, Defendant's "fact" #7 states Mrs. Buttars 
"...did not ever manage the use of the forms." Mrs. Buttars 
gave Mitchell instructions to either rent or sell the forms 
and to keep the rental money to help him get on his feet 
(T.p.84,line 1 5 - 2 5 ) . It seems as if Mrs a Buttars was 
completely in charge of the forms but was intent on helping 
her grandson with his difficulties. Just because she was 
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generous to her grandson does not mean she claimed no right 
or control over the property. Compare T.p.84 line 23-25 
again with fact #9 as claimed by Defendant on p.24 of its 
Brief. 
Mitchell Henderson and Defendant settled up on the 
purchase of the forms when he paid the $6,400. The test-
imony and evidence supports that conclusion. Merely because 
the agreement was made orally between him and Mr. Snarr does 
not mean it should be ignored because two years earlier 
Snarr had Mitchell sign an account agreement. Defendant 
continues to ignore the testimony which indicates that the 
parties agreed to apply the $6,400.00 to the purchase of 
the forms. The account agreement was not given to Mitchell 
and was only in Defendant's possession. (T.p.368 line 7-19.) 
Defendant attempts to prove with exhibits and the testi-
mont of his own witnesses that his position is the correct 
one, and at the same time ignores the testimony and exhibits 
of Plaintiff^' which call for a different conclusion. The 
trial court heard and received the evidence and arguments 
regarding these conflicts and found in favor of the Plaintiffs, 
Mrs. Buttars, etc. It is of no assistance to this Court for 
the Defendant to ignore Plaintiffs' evidence in arguing its 
points on appeal when in fact the trial court has found 
against it. Its only purpose seems to be to further delay 
payment of the judgment which delays prevent Mrs. Buttars 
from paying off at least part of the loan on her farm. 
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Defendant attempts to excuse its inability to dis-
tinguish the forms sold in 1976 from the forms sold in 1978 
saying they were identical so it made no difference c In 
other words they were fungible goods. The trouble with tha 
argument is that they were only fungible so long as both 
groups of forms were new. Anyone knows that once one begin 
using equipment, it receives varying amounts of use, abuse 
and maintenance. Therefore it became critical for the credi 
and debtor to distinguish which forms were which. Defendan 
made no provision for doing so. 
Ill 
THE COURT CAN AWARD DAMAGES TO A PARTY FOR 
ITEMS WHICH WERE NOT PLED BY THAT PARTY 
OR RAISED BY THAT PARTY PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
OTHERWISE RULE 54 (c)(1) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE HAS NO MEANING. 
It became yery clear to the court from the Exhibits 
presented (Exhibit #39) and from Defendant's testimony that 
Plaintiff Hale had been overcharged. This was established 
during the course of trial. (T.pp.433-436.) After this 
fact came to light, Defendant testified that Hale owed a 
balance of about $237.00 (T.p.444 line 5) but that it had 
been written off as a bad debt (T.p.444 line 2 4 - 2 5 ) . An 
attempt to prove the claim with documentary evidence from 
David Hale's business transactions, billings, and the 
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Plaintiff fs aging reports failed to verify the claim. 
(T.pp.444-448. ) Considering the fact that the court heard 
and received all the evidence related to the matter and 
found that David Hale was overcharged $265.00 (Record p . 3 8 2 ) , 
one must assume that the court did not give much weight or 
credit to Defendant's belated claim that Plaintiff Hale 
still owed Defendant some money on an old bad debt. The 
trial judge's assessment of the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses should not be overturned. 
IV 
THE COURT'S DECISION REGARDING LOSS OF 
PROFITS AND RENTALS IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Mrs. Buttars' claim for damages in her complaint was 
that Defendant's wrongful taking of approximately a half set 
of forms rendered the other half useless. (Record p.5 para#3) 
The evidence supports such a claim. Robert Mortensen, a 
respected building contractor familiar with and active in 
the cement forming business testified that to lose approx-
imately a half set of forms would stop a cement former's 
business in its tracks (T.p.379 line 1 3 ) . See also T.pp.42 
line 12-p.44 line 5, and T.p.26 line 14 where Defendant 
admitted that a cement former could not operate with just a 
half set. Both Mitchell and his mother, Laurena, testified 
that they received no rental income after the forms were 
taken except from David Hale who had tried to lease the 
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full set for a couple of jobs before half of them were 
taken. (T.pp.37-40, p . 8 0 ) . Also T.pp c103 line 19-p.104 
1ine 21 . 
Defendant claims that the testimony was insufficient to 
justify the court's award of damages and argued in its Brief 
that a short three months 1 period was insufficient to 
establish rental potential. However, Defendant is reluctant 
to say that no attempt was made to rent the forms proir to 
the spring of 1981, which was the year they were taken. 
T.pp.31 line 16-p.34. When the forms were offered for rent 
there were plenty of takers as long as a full set was available 
Additional proof that the forms were in demand was that all 
forms in Cache Valley were being used during that summer and 
that is why David Hale had to rent forms from Defendant in 
Salt Lake City. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff could have combined the 
% set of Mod-u-forms with his wallmaster forms and continued 
some sort of rental business (Defendant's Brief p.32) but it 
fails to point out that the Wallmasters were a new design 
idea that did not work and that they turned out to be junk. 
(T.p.69 line 8-23; T.pp.78-79.) 
Defendant has referred to some of the exhibits on 
damages which support the court decision. In addition the 
trial judge used the shortest season possible when cal-
culating the losses sustained by Mrs. Buttars by not having 
a full set to rent. The trial court used a six month period 
when the average season in more like eight to ten months,, 
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(T.pp.39-40; T.p.381 line 10-12.) 
In connection with D e f e n d a n t s claim that damages for 
loss of rental was too speculative, the court should remember 
that Defendant testified that as soon as it had gained 
possession of the half set, they were put on its rental pool 
and leased out along with other forms at the rate of 8% of 
new value per month or 96% of new value per year'. T.pp.230-
231; T.p.436 line 24-p.437 line 3. Mr. Mortensen testified 
that he rented his forms at $1.00 per form per job. T.p.381. 
He'd therefore rent a full set of 180 forms for $180.00 to 
pour the foundation on an average house ( T . p . 3 8 2 ) . If we 
merely accept Defendant's claim as to how many forms were 
taken, one would count 83 forms (Exhibit # 2 7 ) . That excludes 
the other equipment it took which were wedge bolts. 
In summary, there were several witnesses who testified 
regarding the rental value and demand for the forms in 1981 . 
It appears that the trial judge in light of all the evidence 
took a conservative approach (six month period) and awarded 
a mere $2,500.00 per year, which is certainly supported by 
evidence given from a variety of witnesses including the 
Defendant. He could have awarded much more. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING ON VALUE OF THE FORMS TAKEN. 
In Defendant's Brief P.37, Defendant makes a bold 
statement: 
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The transcript of the trial is entirely 
void of evidence or testimony to establish 
the value of the forms... 
If the above statement were true the trial court judge 
would not be a judge. Following are some of the references 
to value which the trial court could have considered: 
1. The purchase price of the forms in Augusts 
1978. Exhibit #4 gives the individual price for each form as 
well as the total purchase price of $5,119.21. The forms 
were purchased and then three years later in July, 1981, 
they were taken. This was after prices on identical forms 
had risen substantially. (T.p.234 line 8-p.235 line 3) 
For example, new 2 , x 8 l panels cost $72.00 each in 
May, 1978 (Exhibit # 4 ) . In 1982, their cost had risen to 
$88.32 (Exhibit #26 &#27 first l i n e ) . In 1983 their price 
had risen to $96.00 per panel and in early 1984 prices rose 
again to $106.00 per panel. (T. pp.437-439 line 17) 
The court can observe from reviewing the charges against 
Mitchell's account (Exhibit #3) and the charges on Exhibit 
#4 that even though Mitchell had incurred rent on forms for 
nine months since they were first rented in September, 1977, 
and even though they were probably used when he first began 
renting ( T . p o 2 3 0 ) , he was charged full new price when Defendant 
unilaterally charged his account with their purchase. 
Certainly the account agreement gives Defendant no authority 
to do that. Exhibit #17. This, nevertheless gave the court 
some idea of their value as of that date and that was in a 
used condition. Admittedly Defendant gave Mitchell some 
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credit on the purchase price for the rent paid or charged 
to his account. 
Mitchel and David Hale had taken some of the best forms 
and were cleaning and oiling them in preparation for the two 
jobs that Hale had contracted for in Tremonton just before 
they were taken. (T.p.310; T.p.347 line 14) The point is 
that the forms taken were in better condition than those 
that remained and which Jim Snarr looked at in 1983 in order 
to estimate the value of the forms taken. 
Each time someone rents forms from For-Shor they use a 
printed form which lists the current new value of that item. 
Exhibit #27 and 3rd and 4th pages of Exhibit #39. The 
lessor of the equipment would then multiply the total value 
by 8 percent and that would be the monthly rent. 
It can be seen by careful examination of the Exhibits and 
by Defendant's own admissions and by virtue of Defendant's 
manner of charging rent, the value of used forms in good 
condition was established. See also Exhibit #28 which is a 
list of some of the equipment taken, which reflects the new 
value as of 1982. On the third page of Defendant's Exhibit 
#28, the admitted new price of the forms back in 1982 was 
$8,378.50. The Exhibit then asserts in behalf of Defendant 
that the price should be discounted 30% to cover the cost of 
restoring the forms to new condition. (Bottom of page 3.) 
Of course the controversy was not resolved in 1982 and Mrs. 
Buttars continued to be deprived of her \ set of forms or 
their equivalent value for two more years until the date of 
trial. This of course continued to hurt her ability to sell 
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or rent a complete set, and such will be the case for a 
couple more years when this appeal is finally decided. 
Based upon the Exibits and testimony of both Plaintiffs 
and Defendant there is ample evidence that the equipment was 
worth $5,725.35 at the time of the taking. 
VI 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING 
OF $100.00 DAMAGES FOR THE TRESPASS ON 
LAURENA HENDERSON'S BACK YARD. 
The record (T.pp.97-100) and the exhibits (Exhibit #11) 
amply support the Court's finding that Defendant committed 
trespass (there being approximately six no tresspassing 
signs in the immediate a r e a ) . The record also supports the 
award of $100.00 damages since Defendant's employees traveled 
approximately 90 feet (T.p.100 line 16) across Laurena's 
back lawn part of which was new grass. T o p . l 0 6 . The heavy 
truck made ruts or tire impressions in the grass. T.p.101. 
RESPONDENT'S CONCLUSIONS 
Defendant claims a right to repossess the equipment 
originally leased then sold to Mitchell. It produces no 
signed written lease agreement or even a means of identifying 
its claimed forms. Nor can it overcome the presumption 
in favor of upholding the trial court's decision when there 
is evidence to support it. 
The essence of Defendant's arguments are the same as 
those made to the trial court before its decision. (Compare 
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Defnendat's Trial Brief, Record p.350.) Such arguments are 
of lettle use or value after the trial court makes its 
decision. Defendant must show that there was no basis for 
the court's decision when considering al1 the evidence, not 
just Defendant's evidence and views. 
The trial courts decision on all of the above issues 
should be affirmed and this court should award Plaintiff's 
its costs on appeal and attorney's fees if it finds the appeal 
to be frivolous. 
SUMMARIES OF PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS IN THEIR CROSS-APPEAL 
1 . Intentional In f1i c t i o n of Emoti onal Distress. 
There is no basis in the law for dismissal of a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress merely because 
the person suffering the distress did not own the property 
taken, the loss of which was the major or primary cause for 
the emotional distress. The issue is whether Defendant 
intended to cause Mitchell Henderson emotional distress by 
taking the forms, and did he suffer the emotional distress 
claimed? 
2. Plaintiff's Fa'i 1 ure to Admit. The trial Court 
abused its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees 
and other expenses caused by Plaintiff's failure to admit 
that three documents were identical when the expert witness 
at trial clearly testified that all the documents were 
identical copies and no evidence was presented to the 
contrary. Expenses and fees should also be awarded for re-
quiring Plaintiffs to call the U.S. Bankruptcy Court Clerk 
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to testify regarding it's general practices. 
3. Interference with Favorable Business Relati onshi ps. 
The Trial Court erred in failing to find that Defendant had 
wrongfully interfered with favorable business relationships 
between Plaintiffs Hale and Ileen B u t t a r s , and in awarding 
damages therefor. The evidence was clear and undisputed 
that David Hale had agreed to lease and then to purchase the 
full set of forms. He had informed Defendant of this and 
Defendant then used the information to secretly convert the 
forms to its own use and thereby kill the deal. The impact 
of that action cost David Hale substantial monies and 
prevented him from carrying on further b u s i n e s s . 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF, 
MITCHELL HENDERSON'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS. 
The property taken by Defendant was owned by Ileen 
Buttars by virtue of a sale which took place three years 
earlier. However, Defendant did not know that at the time it 
re-possessed. It thought the property was still owned by 
Mitchell. T . p p . 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 . In fact David Hale was unaware 
that Mitchell was merely selling the forms for his grand-
mother until immediately after July 9, 1981, when they were 
taken. T.p.312 line 16--p.313 line 1. Thus, the action 
which Defendant took with respect to the forms was taken 
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with the thought in mind that the forms belonged to Mitchell, 
T.p.235. The forms were taken just a day or two before they 
were to be used on a job in Tremonton and Defendant knew 
this. Furthermore, Defendant then leased some of its own 
forms to David Hale to fill the void left with half the 
forms turned up missing. No effort was ever made by Defen-
dant to account to Mitchell for the value of the forms after 
they were taken. T.pp.226 line 24-227. When the decision 
was made to take the forms Defendant knew it had taken a 
promissory note for the account and that the note had been 
reduced to a money judgment T.p.235. Yet Defendant went 
ahead with the taking and said nothing to Mitchell. The 
impact that the taking had on Mitchell was dramatic. Knowing 
his grandmother had done him a big favor by borrowing 
against her farm and then purchasing the equipment and 
knowing that she had great trust in him (T „ p . 8 4 line 15-
p.85 line 1; T.p.87 line 20) Mitchell began worrying about 
what the loss would do to his grandmother's ability to pay 
off her farm loan. Later when the Sheriff's Department 
inferred he may have sold the forms, he became worried 
about how he would be able to clear his own name and reputation 
T.p.45 line 1-25; T.o.53 line 1-20. As a result he suffered 
from headaches, sick stomach and other stress-type illnesses 
such as ulsers. T.p.103. All the distress was caused by 
the taking of the forms and Defendant was not about to 
reveal the fact that it had taken them or to even attempt to 
reconcile their taking with any claimed unpaid bill. They 
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simply stole the forms and then let Mitchell and everyone 
else stew and worry while they smiled about getting rid of 
the form rental competition, and having done more rental 
business with David Hale as a result of their theft. A 
nice way to get ahead fast if you don't get caughto The 
simple fact that Mitchell Henderson did not own the forms 
but only felt responsible for them is not sufficient legal 
grounds to dismiss his claim in light of the fact that 
Defendant thought he was the owner and they knew he had made 
arrangements to rent and to sell them to David Hale. T B p . 2 9 2 , 
313 line 14. They most certainly would have known that the 
sudden disappearance of a half set of forms would cause 
someone great concern and distress. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PLAINTIFFS' 
COSTS AND FEES INCURRED IN PROVING THAT 
THE THREE BANKRUPTCY DOCUMENTS WERE 
IDENTICAL COPIES AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S 
GENERAL PRACTICES. 
After the one bankruptcy notice was discovered in 
Defendant's files, Plaintiffs accquired two similar notices 
of bankruptcy sent to other creditors of Mitchell and had 
them analyzed by an expert. R.p.228-229. The three copies 
and the expert's anaylsis were all made available to Defen-
dant and Defendant was requested to admit that all three 
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copies were identical. Rec.p.226. Defendant refused 
(Rec.p.240-241) so Plaintiff was required to bring in the 
expert from Colorado to testify. T.p.109-126. The testimony 
was undisputed and Defendant offered no evidence which was 
contrary to that of the expert. The purpose for proving 
that Defendant had received the notice was to prove that 
Defendant was acting in disregard of the law when it tried 
to take back the forms when it knew its account had been 
extinquished by the bankruptcy filing a year earlier. 
Plaintiffs were trying to prove bad motive and willful! 
misconduct in order to support their claim for punitive 
damages in addition to the damages for interference with 
favorable business relations and intentional infliction of 
mental distress. 
Plaintiff also asked Defendant to admit what the 
bankruptcy court clerk's practice was with respect to making 
copies (T.p.226-227) and again Defendant refused (R . p. 241 ) 
and Plaintiff was required to call the clerk of the bank-
ruptcy court as a witness to prove the general practice. 
T.p. 276-277, 279 line 3-8. 
The court in its Memorandum Decision said that a copy 
of the bankruptcy notice "..turns up in their file.,." 
( R . p . 3 8 1 ) . Plaintiffs' counsel then proposed findings 
asserting that the three copies were identical. Defendant 
objected (R.p.391-392) and the court would not make a 
specific finding on the point other than to say that "...Defen-
dant had a copy of the Bankruptcy notice in its file." 
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R c p . 4 0 6 . Thus 9 the court refused to hold that the three 
copies were identical in the face of uncontroverted evidence 
coming from unimpeached w i t n e s s e s : Norman Erickson, Budge 
Clinic creditor (T . pp.127-131) ; Carol Hansen, Credit Bureau 
Employee ( T . p p . 1 3 2 - 1 3 6 ) ; and Douglas A. Caywood, the docu-
ments expert ( T . p p l 0 9 - 1 2 6 ) . Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Proceedure requires a court to make finding on the 
relevant issues in the case and not to make them in opposition 
to the great weight of the evidence. Boyer Co. v. Lignell 
(Ut. 1977) 567 p. 2d 1112. In this case no real evidence was 
introduced to controvert the facts established by Caywood, 
yet the court seemed hesitant to find as the evidence 
dictated. R o p c 4 0 6 - 4 0 7 ; (Finding no. 14) R . p . 3 9 1 - 3 9 2 ; 
R.p.385. 
If Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure 
dealing with requests for admissions is to serve its purpose 
of narrowing the issues and reducing or minimizing the costs 
of litigation, the court must enforce Rule 37 relating to 
assessing costs and fees which could otherwise have been 
avioded had the party admitted the requested fact. It is not 
justice to allow Defendant to cause the Plaintiffs as much 
expense as possible in bringing their claims to court. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT INTERFERED WITH FAVORABLE 
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF 
HALES AND MRS. BUTTARS WHEN THE AGREEMENTS 
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TO LEASE AND TO SELL THE CEMENT FORMING 
EQUIPMENT WERE RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE TO 
PERFORM BY DEFENDANT'S CONVERSION OF HALF 
OF THAT EQUIPMENT. 
David Hale had agreed to rent and to purchase the 
entire set of forms. T.pp.35 line 6-p.37 line 10; T.p.311; 
T.p.292 line 12. The Defendant found out about it, (T.p.29 
line 12; T.p.311 line 24-p.312 line 3; T.p.313 line 2-15) 
and decided to take them. T.p.292 line 23-p.293. Just 
before the taking, Defendant knew that David Hale was going 
to use the forms on a job, and that up until then Hale had 
been renting forms from Defendant. T.p.292 line 12. After 
the forms were taken, Hale returned to Defendant to rent 
forms to replace the forms that had been stolen (T.p.313 
line 15-p.315 line 2 ) . Defendant gladly rented forms to 
Hale from their rental pool at the rate of 8% of new value 
per month. (Exhibit #39, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th pages.) Of 
course, the effect of the taking was to prevent the sale of 
the entire set to Hale ( T . p . 3 1 1 ) . Plaintiff Buttars not 
only lost the sale but also the rent of a half set for abou 
a month, and Defendant took the business instead. T.p.325 
1ine 9-p.326 1ine 17. 
The taking caused David Hale to withdraw his bid on on 
job in Jackson, Wyoming (T. p.331-332; Exhibit #35) and to g 
through a much more expensive proceedure in doing his 
Tremonton jobs, by renting and returning forms from and to 
Defendant, traveling all the extra mileage and renting 
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trucks, etc. T.pp.315-330. He also lost other buiness. 
T.p.390. 
In Utah we recognize the tort of wrongful interference 
with favorable contractural relations. Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Ut.2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , Leigh Furniture and 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Ut. 1 9 8 2 ) . 
In the Bunnel case Plaintiff made no showing of an 
actionable interference with favorable contractural re-
lations. In the Lei gh case this court indicated that 
wrongful interference with advantageous economic relations 
included not only interference with contractural relations, 
but also other favorable business relationships. 
"However, the right of action for in-
terference with a specific contract is 
but one instance, rather that the total 
class, of protections against wrongful 
interference with advantageous economic 
relations." 657 P.2d 293, 301. 
The court went on to sustain the jury's verdict and to 
indicate that Defendant had wrongfully interfered with 
prospective economic relations. 
In this case before the Court there is substantial 
evidence of the favorable business relationships between 
David Hale and Mitchell Henderson and that the parties 1 
continuation of that relationship was terminated because 
Defendant stole half the equipment. T.p.397 line 12--
p.398 line 17; T.p.415 line 11--22. 
In the Leigh case Plaintiff did not produce evidence of 
a contract or an agreement which was wrongfully interfered 
with so this Court was looking for evidence of other bus-
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iness relationships which would support a verdict in favor 
of Isom. This Court recited its rule as follows: 
"We recognize a common-law cause of action 
for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, and adopt the Oregon 
definition of this tort. Under this defin-
ition, in order to recover damages, the 
Plaintiff must prove (1) that the Defendant 
intentionally enterfered with the Plaintiff's 
existing or potential economic realations, 
(2) for an impropert purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the Plaintiff. 
657 P.2d 293,304. 
The court went on to explain what would be interence 
for an improper purpose or by improper m e a n s . The purposes 
for which the forms were taken was, according to Defendant 
to regain possession of its property. The effect of the 
taking was to put Ileen Buttars out of the form renting 
business and to take some of that business (David Hale's) 
and shift it to Defendant. It is difficult to determine 
which purpose was the primary purpose but both purposes are 
clearly economical. It would be reasonable to assume that 
the purpose giving Defendant the greatest economical ad-
dvantage would be the primary purpose. Here, putting 
Plaintiffs out of the form renting business and to thwart 
the sale to Hale would appear to be to Defendant's best 
advantage in the long run, because Hale was one of Defen-
dant's customers, and Defendant would have another half set 
of forms to rent out. Such a purpose is not and should not 
be labeled proper. 
This court in the Leigh case stated that if the purpose 
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were acceptable, but the means utilized were improper 
Defendant would still be held liable. Were the means 
justified in this case? The means utilized were to convert 
Mrs. Buttars 1 forms and never tell anyone about it until 
months later after the Sheriff's criminal investigation 
located them. 
In explaining what are "improper means" this Court 
stated: 
"The alternative requirement of improper 
means is satisfied where the means used 
to interfere with a party's economic 
relaitons are contrary to law,,such as 
violations of statutes, regulations or 
recognized common-law rules. Such acts 
are illegal or tortious in themselves 
and hence are clearly "improper" means 
of interference." 657 P.2d 293, 308. 
The trial court found that Defendant had taken forms 
which belonged to Mrs. Buttars: 
"The court therefore, holds that 
the repossession of the forms were 
wrongful and that they belonged to 
Mrs. Buttars." Record P.382. 
Clearly, then the favorable business relationships 
existed and were terminated when half the forms were taken. 
Mrs. Buttars lost her rent and her sale, Mr. Hale lost his 
opportunity to do a number of jobs and to go into business 
for himself. The record clearly supports a finding of 
damages resulting to Hale, but the court spent no time in 
assessing the damage because it felt Mr. Hale had no cause 
of action against Defendant For-Shor but should have procee 
against Plaintiff, Mitchell Henderson: 
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"Therefore the damage for wrongful 
repossession occurred to Mrs. Buttars and 
not Mr. Henderson or Mr. Hale. If Mr. Hale 
was damaged, it was between he and Mr. 
Henderson." Record p.38 2 . 
The above portion of the court's decision is that 
portion which Plaintiff contends is not supported by the 
facts and the law and should be reversed. It is true that 
perhaps David Hale could have sued Mrs. Buttars and Mitchell 
Henderson for breach of contract, but because the forms were 
stolen, impossibility of performance would likely have been 
a defense. Even if such a cause of action existed this did 
not limit David Hale's right to pursue his claim against 
Defedant who knowingly broke up the business relationships 
for its own economic gain by converting property it had long 
since sold. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's 
holding as a matter of law that Mitchell had no cause of action 
for intentional infliction of mental d i s t r e s s , and instruct 
the trial court to then consider the issue of liability 
and damages based on the evidence presented. 
2. The Supreme Court should instruct the trial court 
to enter a finding that the three copies of the Notice of 
First Meeting of Creditors were identical and to assess 
costs and attorney's fees against Defendant in accordance 
with the record. Record p p . 4 0 0 - 4 0 2 . 
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3. This court should reverse the trial court's holding 
wherein it held that the facts do no support a cause of 
action for wrongful interference with favorable business 
relationships between Plaintiffs by D e f e n d a n t The trial 
court should then be instructed to assess damages in 
accordance with the evidence on record. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of September, 1985, 
ZOLLINGER & ATW00D 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto for the C o u r t s consideration are 
copies of the following document and excerpts from the District 
Court record and transcript: 
Memorandum Decision 
Trial Exhibit No. 2 - - Bill of Sale, Henderson to Buttars. 
Trial Exhibit No. 6 - - Henderson $6,400.00 check with 
check stub. 
Trial Exhibit No. 11 - - Laurena Henderson's map showing 
no trespassing sign locations 
and Defendant's direction of travel. 
Trial Exhibit No. 27 - - Defendant's form rental sheet. 
Trial Exhibit No. 28 - - Defendant's accounting sheet-
value of forms. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of Respondent's 
Brief were served on Defendant/Appellant's Counsel, James 
C. Jenkins at 67 East TOO North, P.O. Box 3700, Logan, 
Utah 84321. 
DATED this jp day of September, 1985. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON, ILEEN 







Civil No. 20456 
This matter was heard before the Court in a split trial 
secession on August 1 and 2, 19 84 and again on September 17, 19 84. 
Briefs have been submitted after trial by both parties. 
Based on the memorandum and testimony given at the trial, 
the Court now enters this memorandum decision. 
The Court finds that the repossession of the forms by For-
Shore Company was not a legal repossession. They had no right 
to repossess the forms. The forms had been purchased by Mr. 
Henderson, the last payment being in the form of a promissory note 
accepted by the defendant, For-Shore Company and later reduced to 
judgment by them. The judgment may be valid, but there was some 
question on that because of the bankruptcy proceedings, although 
defendant claims they did not receive noticey a copy of the notice 
turns up in their file. Testimony of the plaintiffs is also that 
the forms were sold to the plaintiff's mother, who is one of the 
plaintiffs in this action, Ileen Buttars. It is obvious consideration 
was given since she paid off Mitchells Security Bank loan, some 
$2p,000.00. Defendants may surmise this was only a loan and there was 
no intention to transfer title to Mrs. Buttars by Mr. Henderson, her 
but* 5 7 (ALL?dfl ~~M 
son, but no evidence was offered to rebute this. 
Therefore, the damage for the wrongful repossession occurred 
to Mrs. Buttars and not Mr. Henderson, or Mr. Hale. If Mr. Hale 
was damaged, it was between he and Mr. Henderson, except that Mr. 
Hale should receive and the Court does give judgment to Mr. Hale 
for the $265.00 overcharge by For-Shore to him on rental. The Court 
awards no damages to Mr. Henderson since they were not his forms. 
The Court feels that, although the defendants were a bit tricky in 
learning about the forms and then failing to inform Mr. Hale that 
they were the ones who took the forms after he told them they were 
stolen. It does not meet the criteria of punitive damages as set 
forth in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2nd 293. 
The Court therefore, holds that the resposession of the forms 
was wrongful and that they belong to Mrs. Buttars. Damages are 
awarded for the value of the forms taken in the amount of $5,725.35. 
And, since the defendant has used the forms for three years and 
generated revenue from them, Mrs. Buttars has been deprived during 
that time of their use. A full set being of the rental value of 
about $5,000.00 per year, but there being only taken a half set 
*. the Court will award $2,50 0.0 0 damages per year for the three years 
Tpr $7,500.00. 
T»p'ar* **\ tf*In addition the Court will award $100.00 damages for the 
* w trespass which occurred in taking the forms. 
> tyx - This being a total judgment to Mrs. Buttars in the amount of 
I V $13,325.35 and the judgment to Mr. Hale for $265.00. Counsel 
*^^\ fo^-fuaintiff to prepare the appropriate findings and judgment. 
:
 t„rJ> Dated this / irk day of December, 1984. 
BY THE/ COURT?' , t i *-. ]/ // L /l/U I/// U^r~~r-. n ~*~ 
Thia 'a*ra«!!*ant wada th ia day -y/jS J?° batwaan Mitahall Handaraan, 
^ party ©f tha f i r a t part 
and Eilaan Buttara, Clarkston, Utah 
party ©f tha aaa®nd part 
Witnaiaath.: 
That tha party af tha f i r a t part ajrraea ta i e l l . t a £ha:party of the 
aaaond part the daaaribdd aquipaent apparirin^ en a, aaj3arata ahaat, affixad 
:.ta pajf on*, far tha aua a n J ^ ^ L ^^^ 
k ±(»r^<V . * T ' (/ ' 
Thia tranaaatian ia in a^midaratian af a laan in fayar af tha 
party af tha firat part, wharin tha party af tha aaaand *r+t% viil ratal* 
an! aaa««o awnarahip af tha daaaribad aquipnent.. 
7' 
Si^aad in tha praaanaa af 
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